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How the War on Terror May Affect
Domestic Interrogations:
The 24 Effect
Sam Kamin*
INTRODUCTION
For the first time since Miranda was decided nearly forty
years ago,1 interrogation techniques have been at the forefront of
the American consciousness. The War on Terror has forced
Americans to grapple with the definition of torture, whether torture is ever an appropriate interrogation technique, whether it is
an effective interrogation technique, and so on. Unlike many
past discussions of interrogation techniques, the current torture
debate has not been limited to law enforcement and the legal
academy; discussions of torture and “hard treatment” have been
front page news, have permeated popular culture, and have
forced the American people to examine their preconceptions of
the appropriateness of coercion in obtaining information from
suspects.
I call the omnipresence of depictions and discussions of torture in popular culture the “24 Effect.”2 We see torture depicted
in fiction,3 on the news,4 and on the internet.5 My concern is not
* Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Ph.D. 2000, J.D.
1996, University of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1992, Amherst College. The author wishes
to thank the organizers of this Symposium, Alan Chen, Louis Frankenthaler, Viva Moffat,
and Matt Parlow. All errors remain mine alone.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 The effect is, of course, named after the Fox television show 24. The show and its
effect are described in Part III, infra.
3 24 is the most obvious example, but clearly far from the only one. See, e.g., David
Edelstein, Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex: Torture Porn, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 6, 2006, at
63.
4 The Fox News Channel ran a three-part report on “waterboarding,” an interrogation technique known to have been used by American forces interrogating terror suspects
overseas. A Fox reporter agreed to undergo the procedure at the hands of private soldiers
dressed in black hoods. He concluded that while it would be impossible to describe the
procedure as anything other than torture, it was certainly “effective.” See Steve Harrigan,
Waterboarding:
Historically
Controversial,
FOXNEWS.COM,
Nov.
7,
2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,227357,00.html.
5 The now-infamous photographs of the torture and degradation of prisoners at the
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq are available from numerous sources and in more excruciating
detail on the internet than they ever were in the mainstream American press. One of the
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that the 24 Effect will necessarily cause torture to spill over from
the War on Terror into local police departments’ interrogation
rooms.6 I do not believe that the causal relationship is nearly
that direct.7 Rather, my concern is that once the public has become inured to torture by its repeated factual and fictional representations—even its disturbing representations—the public will
increasingly discount the effect of non-physical coercive interrogation techniques on criminal defendants and will become more
receptive to the use of those non-torturous techniques in run-ofthe-mill criminal cases.
The ultimate result of the 24 Effect, therefore, will likely be
a shifting of the baseline for permissible treatment of criminal
defendants; because psychological coercion, trickery, false promises and threats have a lesser visceral impact than the physical
milder examples can be found on the Salon.com website along with an extensive exposition of the history of abuse in Abu Ghraib. See Joan Walsh, The Abu Ghraib Files,
SALON.COM,
Oct.–Dec.
2003,
http://www.salon.com/news/abu_ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction/index.html.
6 Of course, it is not always easy to distinguish “crime” from the “War on Terror.”
Take, for example, the case of Jose Padilla. He was arrested at O’Hare airport in Chicago
in May of 2002 and held in a Navy brig in South Carolina for several years, allegedly suspected of plotting to explode a dirty bomb in the United States. Just before his habeas
petition was due to be heard by the Supreme Court, Padilla was transferred to a civilian
prison and is currently awaiting greatly reduced charges in the Southern District of Florida. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline Terrorism Case of a U.S. Citizen, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2006, at A1; Errin Haines, Appeals Court Weighs Padilla Charge, FOXNEWS.COM,
Jan.
10,
2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2007Jan10/
0,4670,PadillaTerrorCharges,00.html; see also Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006).
For a fuller discussion of the interaction between civilian criminal prosecutions and the
War on Terror, see M. Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warnings, Torture, the Right to
Counsel and the War on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 619 (2007); Joan L. Larsen, Visiting Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Remarks at the Chapman Law Review Symposium: Miranda at 40: Applications in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.chapman.edu/LawReview/symposium2007_webcast.asp (follow
“Click here for Panel #1” hyperlink).
7 There is some evidence, however, that what appears on television has a direct effect on interrogation techniques in the field. For example, an Army official recently met
with writers and producers of the Fox Television show 24 in order to try to convince them
that their show had a deleterious effect on interrogations in the military.
[The army officials] had come to voice their concern that the show’s central political premise—that the letter of American law must be sacrificed for the country’s security—was having a toxic effect. In their view, the show promoted unethical and illegal behavior and had adversely affected the training and
performance of real American soldiers. “I’d like them to stop,” [one officer] said
of the show’s producers. “They should do a show where torture backfires.”
....
. . . The third expert at the meeting was Tony Lagouranis, a former Army
interrogator in the war in Iraq. He told the show’s staff that DVDs of shows
such as “24” circulate widely among soldiers stationed in Iraq. Lagouranis said
to me, “People watch the shows, and then walk into the interrogation booths
and do the same things they’ve just seen.”
Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes: Torture on “24”, NEW YORKER, Feb. 19 & 26, 2007, at 66,
72, 77.
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torture to which we are all becoming accustomed, courts as well
as the public at large are likely to become more accepting of these
techniques. This is particularly distressing given the fact that
non-torturous but coercive interrogation techniques are highly
correlated with unreliable confessions and with wrongful convictions.8 Thus, in addition to the dignitary harms that befall criminal defendants and the rest of society whenever statements are
coerced from criminal defendants, the bottom-line result of the 24
Effect will be more convictions of the innocent and, by logical extension, more guilty criminals going unpunished.
In this Article, I briefly trace the history of police interrogation and its legal regulation in the United States, from the founding-era understanding that a defendant’s silence was entitled to
great respect, to the modern practice of Miranda warnings and
voluntariness inquiries. I then turn to the portrayal of torture in
contemporary media, arguing that whatever the motivation may
be for the production of these images, their effect will be to desensitize Americans to the effects of torture. Returning then to
interrogation, I argue that this desensitizing effect of omnipresent torture will make Americans more accepting of coercive but
nonviolent interrogation techniques. I show that, given the close
connection between coercive interrogation techniques and wrongful convictions, we should be very concerned about this development, regardless of our thoughts about the continuing wisdom
and relevance of the Miranda decision.
I. HISTORY—THE EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
AND THEIR REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Not much is known about interrogation techniques prior to
the turn of the last century.9 Because the individual guarantees
of the Fifth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights had not
yet been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Four-

8 See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791
(2006); TIMOTHY SULLIVAN, UNEQUAL VERDICTS: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS 23–
47, 84–85 (1992).
9 It is known that compulsory questioning of witnesses was a favorite technique of
the Star Chamber, and that the Fifth Amendment adopted the then-common practice in
the colonies of prohibiting the compulsory questioning of suspects at trial. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2649 (1996); 4 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT [WICKERSHAM COMMISSION], REPORT ON PROSECUTION 25–26 (1931). A
number of commentators have argued that the right was meant to be limited to questioning in the courtroom. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court’s Construction of
the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1930). For a discussion of early understandings of the Fifth Amendment, see generally Alschuler, supra.
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teenth Amendment,10 there was relatively little litigation of interrogation cases until the late nineteenth century.11 In one of
the first such cases, the 1897 case of Bram v. United States,12 the
Supreme Court held that any official inducements or threats
whatsoever were sufficient to render a confession invalid.13 Borrowing from centuries of English common law, the Bram Court
determined that the use of threats or promises to induce a defendant to confess violated the defendant’s rights under the Fifth
Amendment.14
The facts of Bram are illustrative. Bram was suspected of
murder. Another suspect, Brown, had been interviewed prior to
Bram’s interrogation. The examining officer admitted in court
that he had said the following to Bram:
“Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed the captain from
all I have heard from Mr. Brown. But,” I said, “some of us here think
you could not have done all that crime alone. If you had an accom-

10 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968) (cataloguing the incorporation of various rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
11 Alan G. Gless, Self-Incrimination Privilege Dvelopment [sic] in the NineteenthCentury Federal Courts: Questions of Procedure, Privilege, Production, Immunity and
Compulsion, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 391 (2001).
The United States Supreme Court did not decide a self-incrimination issue
in a federal criminal case during the first ninety years after the ratification of
the Fifth Amendment. The reason was simple. The Court almost completely
lacked any appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal cases for most of the
first ninety years.
Id. at 393.
12 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
13 Id. at 565. It is also fairly clear that the Court did not entirely mean what it said
in Bram. As Professor Marcus has argued:
The greatest reach of this notion would be to take it literally so that any
degree of inducement would be sufficient to invalidate an otherwise permissible statement by the defendant. Not surprisingly, very few courts have ever
followed such an interpretation. Instead, the modern view of the statement is
that threats and promises are to be taken seriously but that these are rarely
determinative on their own.
Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just about Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions
in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 606 (2006).
14 A number of critics have lambasted Bram as a misreading of both the Fifth
Amendment and the English cases on which the Court purported to base its decision. See,
e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005).
Rather than examine the text, the Court simply borrowed the voluntariness test from a line of early English and American common law cases and
used it in place of the compulsion paradigm textually delineated within the
self-incrimination clause. While these early cases stand for the proposition
that confessions must be voluntary in order to be admissible, they are historically unrelated to the self-incrimination clause and the interrogation practices
the self-incrimination clause was intended to ban.
Id. at 478 (citations omitted); Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme
Court, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 777 n.101 (“As a matter of history the Bram Court was
probably wrong.” (citations omitted)).
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plice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime
on your own shoulders.”15

The court invalidated the confession on the basis of these
statements by the officer.16 Needless to say, such comments
would hardly raise an eyebrow today. The police officers in Bram
encouraged Bram to confess, but certainly did nothing that would
render his confession involuntary under the standard currently
applied by our courts.17
It is fairly clear that, although the Bram Court was extremely protective of the rights of suspects, interrogation practices in the United States did not necessarily follow suit. In particular, with regard to minority or unpopular defendants, it is
clear that police practices during this time were anything but
protective of the rights and dignity of suspects.18 In the 1930s,
the Wickersham Commission Report on police practices both exposed and decried the widespread physical abuse of criminal suspects at the hands of interrogators throughout this country.
To obtain confessions or admissions the officers (usually detectives)
proceed to “work” the prisoner. “Work” is the term used to signify any
form of what is commonly called the third degree, and may consist in
nothing more than a severe cross-examination. Perhaps in most cases
it is no more than that, but the prisoner knows that he is wholly at
the mercy of his inquisitor and that the severe cross-examination may
at any moment shift to a severe beating. This knowledge itself undoubtedly induces speedy confessions in many instances and makes
unnecessary a resort to force. If the prisoner refuses to answer, he
may be returned to his cell with notice that there he will stay till
ready to “come clean.” The cell may be especially chosen for the purpose—cold, dark, without bed or chair. The sweat box is a small cell
completely dark and arranged to be heated till the prisoner, unable to
endure the temperature, will promise to answer as desired. Or refusal
to answer may be overcome by whipping, by beating, with rubber
hose, clubs, or fists, or by kicking, or by threats, or promises.
Powerful lights turned full on the prisoner’s face, or switched on
and off, have been found effective. The electric chair is another device
to extort confessions.
The most commonly used method is persistent questioning, con-

Bram, 168 U.S. at 539.
Id. at 564–65.
For a discussion of current confession law, see infra Part II.
There is a strong overlap between the Court’s criminal procedure cases and its
cases protecting racial minorities. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305–06 (1982) (“Although the
Court had never treated them as race cases, there can be little doubt that the decisions in
Moore v. Dempsey, Powell v. Alabama, and Brown v. Mississippi made new criminal procedure law in part because the notorious facts of each case exemplified the national scandal of racist southern justice.” (citations omitted)).
15
16
17
18
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tinuing hour after hour, sometimes by relays of officers. It has been
known since 1500 at least that deprivation of sleep is the most effective torture and certain to produce any confession desired.19

The Wickersham Commission did not merely describe the
third degree, it decried it; the Commission noted that torture was
a sign of laziness and a lack of initiative on the part of law enforcement. Only a police officer without faith in his own wits and
intelligence, the Commission argued, would resort to brute force
in order to obtain a confession.20
The kind of brutality discussed by the Wickersham Commission led to a national revulsion21 and was unequivocally rejected
by the Supreme Court shortly thereafter. In Brown v. Mississippi,22 the Supreme Court was confronted with a case in which a
Mississippi sheriff’s deputy admitted quite freely to brutalizing a
black defendant in very much the same way described by the
Wickersham Commission.
[T]he two last named defendants were made to strip and they were
laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap
with buckles on it, and they were likewise made by the said deputy
definitely to understand that the whipping would be continued unless
and until they confessed, and not only confessed, but confessed in
every matter of detail as demanded by those present; and in this
manner the defendants confessed the crime, and as the whippings
progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of
their torturers.
....
. . . It is interesting to note that in his testimony with reference to
the whipping of the defendant Ellington, and in response to the inquiry as to how severely he was whipped, the deputy stated, “Not too

19

(1931).

11 WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 47

The Commission decried these tactics as laziness in the extreme.
A former district attorney of New York County said: “It would enhance the ability of the police force if the practice was stamped out. It is a short cut and
makes the police lazy and unenterprising.” Another former New York prosecutor stated that it impaired police efficiency; if the police “could not get their results by brawn, they were helpless.”
Id. at 188.
21 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional
Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 313–14 (2003).
“Third degree” brutality by police officials, however, was judged constitutionally
anathema by the Supreme Court in the aftermath of the exposure and condemnation of the practice by such authorities as the American Bar Association and
the Wickersham Commission Report in the early 1930s. That official rejection
was reinforced by the revulsion against torture as characteristic of America’s totalitarian enemies.
Id. (citations omitted).
22 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
20
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much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it were left to
me.” Two others who had participated in these whippings were introduced and admitted it—not a single witness was introduced who denied it. The facts are not only undisputed, they are admitted, and admitted to have been done by officers of the state, in conjunction with
other participants, and all this was definitely well known to everybody
connected with the trial, and during the trial, including the state’s
prosecuting attorney and the trial judge presiding.23

The Court acknowledged that while the states are generally
free to organize their criminal justice systems however they wish,
such freedom comes with clear boundaries.
Because a State may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that
it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may
not be substituted for the witness stand. The State may not permit an
accused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination—where the
whole proceeding is but a mask—without supplying corrective process.24

Clearly, the Court argued, the abuse of criminal defendants in
order to obtain a confession fell beyond the permissible range of
options available to the states.
Although it would be naïve to think that the Court’s decision
in Brown single-handedly caused the cessation of the third degree,25 the available empirical evidence certainly indicates that
by the time Miranda was decided some thirty years later, the
third degree as an interrogation technique had virtually disappeared from contemporary police practice.26 While prisoners and
defendants were no doubt still being abused at the hands of police after the Supreme Court prohibited such practices, Brown
and its progeny had made clear that using physical violence to
extract information was worse than useless in terms of criminal
prosecution.27 If police wished merely to harm or intimidate
those under their custody, they could continue to do so subject
only to civil and criminal actions against them; if they wished to
prosecute those abused defendants in court using information ob23 Id. at 284–85 (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470–71 (Mo. 1935) (Griffith, J.,
dissenting)).
24 Id. at 285–86. Of course, the Supreme Court would later conclude that a state
may not do away with trial by jury. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
25 As Richard Leo argues, the professionalization of police departments throughout
the nation also played an important part in the disappearance of the third degree. Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in
America, 18 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 47–52 (1992).
26 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, at 446–48 (1966) (noting that, although instances of the third degree clearly continued to exist, “we stress that the modern
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented”).
27 See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, American Interrogation: From Torture to Trickery, in
TORTURE: A COLLECTION 105 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (discussing the legal admissibility of torture-induced confessions).
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tained through the third degree, however, Bram and its progeny
made clear that they would be unable to do so.28
Police departments reacted to the loss of the third degree by
developing a number of interrogation techniques designed to
achieve the third degree’s goals. When Miranda was decided in
1966, requiring the now-familiar warnings in all instances of custodial interrogation, the Court made extensive reference to the
coercive but non-violent interrogation techniques catalogued and
perfected by Inbau and Reid in their police interrogation materials and in wide use throughout the country.29
Although the Miranda Court was extremely critical of these
interrogation techniques, it chose not to invalidate them wholesale, but rather to interpose the four warnings30 between the accused and that coercion. As commentators have criticized for
nearly forty years, once a defendant has been made aware of and
voluntarily waived his rights, the inherently coercive techniques
that the Court criticized in Miranda may continue to be used so
long as they do not render the defendant’s confession “involuntary.”31
See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 (“The interrogator should direct his comments
toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure by asking
the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad family
life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for
women. The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to
cast blame on the victim, or on society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in a
psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to
know already—that he is guilty.” (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 34–43, 87, 43–55 (1962))); see also id. at 451 (“Where
emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving
the subject no prospect of surcease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him
with his inexorable will to obtain the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of several
hours pausing only for the subject’s necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid a
charge of duress that can be technically substantiated. In a serious case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but with no
respite from the atmosphere of domination. It is possible in this way to induce the subject
to talk without resorting to duress or coercion. The method should be used only when the
guilt of the subject appears highly probable.”
(quoting
CHARLES E. O’HARA,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 112 (1956))).
30 The police must warn a suspect: 1) that he has the right to remain silent, 2) that
anything he says may be used against him, 3) that he has the right to an attorney, and 4)
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed to represent him. Id. at 444.
31 See, e.g., Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007,
1020 (1988).
[W]aiver . . . appeared to be the Achilles’ heel of the Miranda decision. The
Supreme Court emphasized the conditions and inherent evils of custodial interrogation in concluding that the process was inherently coercive. As a result,
the voluntariness test could not be relied upon to regulate confession admissibility. However, the question remained whether these same factors would undercut the legitimacy of Miranda waivers. The more astute custodial suspects
28
29
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It is important to remember that the Court did not replace
the voluntariness test that had preceded Miranda with a test
that looked merely at whether or not the Miranda warnings were
administered.32 Rather, the Court created an additional layer of
protection on top of the voluntariness inquiry: A confession obtained in violation of Miranda is irrebuttably presumed to be involuntary.33 However, a confession obtained after the Miranda
warnings have been read to a defendant is admissible only so
long as both the waiver of Miranda rights and the subsequent
confession itself were voluntarily obtained.34
II. INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS TODAY
There has been much scholarly discussion in recent years regarding the effect that the Miranda warnings have had on the
number of confessions obtained from criminal suspects. Some
have argued that the warnings have lead to the rejection of a
number of otherwise voluntary confessions and to the loss of
many convictions.35 Others have argued with equal force that,
while confessions may have been lost immediately following the
Miranda decision, police departments have effectively adapted to
the new rules, developing techniques that are at least as efficient
at obtaining confessions from resistant defendants as the coercive techniques used before Miranda. Just as police departments
adapted to the loss of the third degree following Brown, they
have adapted to the warnings that the Miranda dissenters worried would be the death of confessions in criminal investigation.36
Regardless of whether the number of confessions since
would now be able to assert their rights, but the remainder might well succumb to the environment and waive their rights due to “inherent coercion” just
as pre-Miranda suspects had succumbed and answered police questions.
Id.

32 Congress attempted to undo this decision in 1968 with its passage of § 3501, which
stated that voluntariness was the only standard for determining the admissibility of confessions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
33 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (“The warnings required and the waiver necessary in
accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.”).
34 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“The requirement
that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.”); Marcus, supra note 13, at 638 (“The test today for voluntariness remains what it
has been for more than half a century: Judges ‘look at the totality of the circumstances of
the case in determining whether the confession was voluntary.’” (quoting State v. Barden,
572 S.E.2d 108, 124 (N.C. 2002))).
35 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996).
36 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996); Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996).
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Miranda has gone up or down, nearly everyone seems to agree
that contemporary courts place enormous weight on whether
Miranda warnings were given, essentially endorsing as voluntary any statement that is made following the warnings and the
voluntary waiver of the rights contained therein.37 For much the
same reason that the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave a precursor to the Miranda warnings long before they were required
to do so, many prosecutors and members of law enforcement opposed the argument in Dickerson to return to the pre-Miranda
status quo. The warnings have so immunized the police conduct
that follows that, as one of the participants in this Symposium
succinctly put it, “If the [Supreme] Court had not imposed the
warnings on the police, they would eventually have discovered
their value and given them anyway.”38

See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense
with the voluntariness inquiry. But as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty,
“[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a selfincriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)).
38 Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L.
REV. 551, 566 (2007). In fact, as the Supreme Court noted in Miranda, the Federal Bureau of Investigations was giving warnings akin to those mandated in Miranda prior to
the Court’s mandate. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483. As proof that courts are not taking seriously the requirement of judging the totality of the circumstances in cases in which a defendant was properly Mirandized, consider the following from a recent article by Professor
Marcus:
This Article has considered thousands of opinions on confessions from the
past two decades. One necessarily comes away with a feeling of being unclean
and tainted by government activities that are not honorable even given the environment needed for interrogations. Many judges allow confessions into evidence in cases in which police interrogators lied and threatened defendants or
played on the mental, emotional, or physical weaknesses of suspects. While
judges write that they do not condone such conduct and find such practices repugnant, reprehensible, or deplorable, some of those same judges have upheld
the admission of such confessions that result from those practices after applying the totality of circumstances test.
Marcus, supra note 13, at 643 (citations omitted). See also Richard A. Leo, Questioning
the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1021–22
(2001).
[F]or the most part, Miranda has helped, not hurt, law enforcement. As argued above, Miranda has helped law enforcement by de facto displacing the
case-by-case voluntariness standard as the primary test of a confession’s admissibility, in effect shifting courts’ analysis from the voluntariness of a confession to the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. By creating the opportunity
for police to read suspects their constitutional rights and by allowing police to
obtain a signed waiver form that signifies consensual and non-coercive interrogation, Miranda has helped the police shield themselves from evidentiary challenges, rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/or involuntary confessions.
Id. (citations omitted).
37
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III. DEPICTIONS OF INTERROGATION AND TORTURE IN THE PUBLIC
CONSCIOUSNESS
It is against this legal and historical background that the
current public discussions and depictions of torture and hard
treatment appear. At least since the start of the War on Terror
in 2001, discussions and depictions of torture have been frontpage news in the United States. Leaked photographs of mistreated prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq made primetime news,39 Congress and the executive branch have debated the
appropriate role of torture in American foreign policy,40 and furor
arose over the so-called “torture memo,” in which now-Attorney
General Alberto Gonzalez argued that the Geneva Convention’s
prohibitions on torture do not apply to terror suspects.41 The legal academy was drawn into the popular debate on terror, led in
no small part by University of California, Berkeley law professor
John Yoo, who was a deputy to Gonzalez at the time the torture
memo was written,42 and who has written extensively on how international agreements on the treatment of prisoners do not apply to the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.43
At the same time that this discussion of actual American pol39 Charlotte Sector, More Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse Photos Leaked: Australian TV
Sidesteps Efforts by the U.S. Government to Squash Release, ABC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1621440.
40 For example, on December 14, 2005, the House of Representatives passed the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. (2005), a bill regulating
interrogation by U.S. military officials. The bill, already passed by the Senate, received
the grudging support of the White House; it was signed into law by President Bush on December 30, 2005. See Josh White, President Relents, Backs Torture Ban: McCain Proposal
Had Veto-Proof Support, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Press Release, The White
House, President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the “Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and
Pandemic
Influenza
Act,
2006”
(Dec.
30,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
41 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to President George W. Bush (Jan. 25,
2002), available at http://msnbc.com/modules/newsweek/pdf/gonzales_memo.pdf. In the
memo, Gonzalez defends the need to dispense with the Geneva Conventions on the
grounds that “[t]he nature of the new war places a high premium on other factors, such as
the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in
order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians.” Id. at 2.
42 Boalt Hall School of Law, Professor John Yoo, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
faculty/yooj/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
43 While not discussing his role in the production of the torture memo, Professor Yoo
defends much of its contents in John Yoo, Behind the ‘Torture Memos’, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (N. Cal. Edition), Jan. 2, 2005, at 1P. Yoo is hardly the only legal academic, however, who has weighed in on the torture debate. See, e.g., TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 27; Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19 (arguing that nonlethal torture techniques “such as sterile
needles, being inserted beneath the nails to cause excruciating pain” should be permitted
if law enforcement demonstrates to a magistrate the “absolute need to obtain immediate
information in order to save lives coupled with probable cause that the suspect had such
information and is unwilling to reveal it”).
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icy was making headlines, the media began bombarding us with
fictional depictions of torture. In movies,44 on television,45 even
in the streets (see image, below), depictions of torture are everywhere in our popular culture.

MILTON GLASER & MIRKO ILIĆ, THE DESIGN OF DISSENT 66 (2005). Such
images have become the subject of a variety of parodies or social commentaries.

In 2006, David Edelstein of New York Magazine coined the
phrase “torture porn” to describe a new slate of horror movies
aimed at teenagers, linking the rise of “torture porn” to contem44 The PG-13 James Bond film Casino Royale had a scene of graphic genital torture.
CASINO ROYALE (MGM 2006). The Oscar-winning film The Last King of Scotland explicitly depicts a man being hung from meat hooks piercing his chest. THE LAST KING OF
SCOTLAND (DNA Films 2006). In Hostel, vivisections of unsuspecting tourists are par for
the course. HOSTEL (Hostel LLC 2005).
45 See, e.g., 24: Day 6: 11:00 AM–12:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 29, 2007).
24 is the most obvious example, but others come to mind. For example, a recurring theme
on ABC’s Lost is the toll that becoming a torturer during war has had on one of the characters. Although the character is clearly haunted by what he has done, his skills come in
handy more than once. Lost: One of Them (ABC television broadcast Feb. 15, 2006); Lost:
Enter 77 (ABC television broadcast Mar. 7, 2007).
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porary events:
Post-9/11, we’ve engaged in a national debate about the morality of
torture, fueled by horrifying pictures of manifestly decent men and
women (some of them, anyway) enacting brutal scenarios of domination at Abu Ghraib. And a large segment of the population evidently
has no problem with this. Our righteousness is buoyed by propaganda
like the TV series 24, which devoted an entire season to justifying torture in the name of an imminent threat: a nuclear missile en route to
a major city. Who do you want defending America? Kiefer Sutherland
or terrorist-employed civil-liberties lawyers?46

Edelstein argues that in the wake of pictures and discussion
of actual torture on the front page of the newspaper, torture has
become far more acceptable in fiction: “Explicit scenes of torture
and mutilation were once confined to the old 42nd
Street . . . whereas now they have terrific production values and
a place of honor in your local multiplex.”47 In other words, events
have taken torture mainstream.48
As Edelstein’s article makes clear, when it comes to depictions of torture in the post-9/11 universe, the Fox show 24 stands
above all others.49 Centered on the Los Angeles office of the fictional Counter-Terrorism Unit (“CTU”), 24 is primarily the story
of a single agent, Jack Bauer, portrayed by Kiefer Sutherland.50
Edelstein, supra note 3, at 64.
Id.
See John Hayes, Tolerance for Torture: TV and Movies Up the Ante on Graphic
Torture Scenes and Audiences Keep Coming Back for More, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Jan. 19, 2007, at C-1.
The American security agent is strapped to a chair beside a table covered
with knives and assorted medical tools. A sadistic Middle Eastern terrorist
whispers gentle insults into his ear as he roughly twists the blade—and the
agent screams in agony.
46
47
48

It’s not a midnight screening of a campy 1960s Russ Meyer splatter classic,
or even an R-rated teen slasher film. It’s the sixth-season premiere of the Fox
TV hit “24.”
....
It’s curious that America’s taste for more fictional media torture is happening at a time when real-life torture is a daily ordeal in Iraq, and the nation is
debating America’s use of coercive interrogation methods and splitting hairs
over the definition of “torture.”
Id.

49 The Parents Television Council, a non-partisan organization that monitors the
content of prime-time television shows, has singled out 24 for the darkness of its content:
The PTC review found that Fox’s “24” showed 67 scenes of torture in the
first five seasons. Upon review of prime time broadcast programming from
1995 to 2001, there were 110 scenes of torture. From 2002 to 2005, the number
increased to 624 scenes of torture.
Press Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Calls for More Network Responsibility
over Violent Content: PTC Reveals New Research on Torture Scenes (Feb. 14, 2007),
available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/release/2007/0214.asp.
50 Parents Television Council, Twenty Four—Parents Television Council Family TV
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Jack and CTU battle repeated terrorist attacks on American soil,
relying on improbably sophisticated surveillance technology,51
flawless intuition,52 and, quite often, torture.53
The sixth season of the show has been no exception. In the
first three weeks the show was on the air, spanning six episodes,
Jack is released from a Chinese prison, bearing the physical and
emotional scars of nearly two years of what was likely nearly
constant torture.54 He is released only to be handed over to a
Middle-Eastern terrorist who has promised to cease his attacks
against American civilians in exchange for the right to torture
Jack who, it turns out, had tortured the terrorist’s brother years
before.55 Jack escapes his sadistic captor and, within hours, is
interrogating his own brother.56 Rightly intuiting that his interrogation subject has not told him the complete truth, Jack ties
him to a chair and holds a plastic bag over his head, cutting off
his breathing until he gives up the truth about nuclear devices
loose on American soil.57
Here is what we have learned about torture from 24, not just
this season, but throughout its run. First, torture works. The
imposition of torture on a suspect invariably and almost instantaneously forces the suspect to speak and to speak truthfully

Guide Show Page, http://www.parentstv.org/ptc/shows/main.asp?shwid=1538 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2007); FOX Television Broadcast Company, 24, http://www.fox.com/24/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
51 See, e.g., 24: Day 4: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 10, 2005);
24: Day 6: 1:00 PM–2:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 12, 2007) (using real-time
satellite feeds to track moving suspects and vehicles). The technical savvy of CTU stands
in marked contrast to the technological backwardness of actual U.S. counter-terrorism
officials. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, FBI Pushed Ahead with Troubled Software, WASH. POST,
June 6, 2005, at A1 (describing the FBI’s failed attempt to develop a computerized case
management system which ended up costing taxpayers $170 million); Noah Shachtman,
The Federal Bureau of Luddites: Why There Are Still FBI Agents Who Don’t Have E-mail
Addresses, SLATE, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2139274/ (describing the FBI’s
inability to provide email addresses to all of its relevant employees). See also Timothy P.
Carney, I am Jack Bauer: What 24 Means for Homeland Security, NAT’L REV. ONLINE,
June 26, 2006, http://search.nationalreview.com (enter “I Am Jack Bauer” (including quotation marks) in “Search Terms” field and click “Search”).
52 See, for example, 24: 12:00 AM–1:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Nov. 6, 2001),
where Jack blackmails George Mason upon speculation that he stole money from the government; 24: Day 2: 12:00 PM–1:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Nov. 26, 2002), where
Jack deduces that Mason is suffering from radiation sickness; and 24: Day 6: 10:00 AM–
11:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 22, 2007), when Jack decides his brother is lying
about his level of knowledge based solely on his brother’s mannerisms.
53 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
54 24: Day 6: 6:00 AM–7:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 14, 2007).
55 Id.
56 Id.; 24: Day 6: 7:00 AM–8:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 14, 2007); 24: Day
6: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM, supra note 52; 24: Day 6: 11:00 AM–12:00 PM, supra note 45.
57 24: Day 6: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM, supra note 52; 24: Day 6: 11:00 AM–12:00 PM, supra note 45; 24: Day 6: 12:00 PM–1:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 5, 2007).
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about what she knows.58 Jack Bauer can tell when a suspect is
lying or withholding important evidence and his application of
torture can make the suspect speak and make him speak truthfully.59 On a recent episode of the show, Jack uses a high-tech
lie-detector to augment his impeccable intuition regarding
whether or not a suspect is telling all he knows.60 Although liedetectors in the real world are so unreliable that their results are
almost never admissible at trial, on television they are infalli-

58 See, for example, 24: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 12,
2002), where Jack slams a man’s head into a partition, tapes him up, and threatens to
torture him if the man does not take Jack to where his wife and daughter are being held
hostage, which he does; 24: Day 2: 9:00 PM–10:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 25,
2003), where Jack shoots a woman suspected of having information about a bomb in the
arm and then refuses to give her pain medication until she divulges the information about
the location of a bomb, which again, she does; 24: Day 3: 8:00 AM–9:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Apr. 27, 2004), where Jack threatens to torture the daughter of a man who
is about to release a deadly virus in San Francisco in order to find out his location; 24:
Day 4: 12:00 AM–1:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Apr. 18, 2005), where Jack breaks a
suspect’s fingers, one by one, to get him to release the whereabouts of another suspected
terrorist; 24: Day 5: 9:00 PM–10:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Mar. 27, 2006), when
the “torture tools” are brought out and Jack’s love interest is given a drug to induce her to
talk, and Jack threatens to kill another woman in order to get her to admit that she, not
Jack’s love interest, is the real culprit; 24: Day 6: 5:00 PM–6:00 PM (FOX television
broadcast Mar. 5, 2007), when Jack uses a cigar cutter to cut off the tip of a suspect’s
pinky, and the suspect then states that a terrorist is in the Mojave Desert preparing to
launch aerial drones to deliver nuclear warheads. There is, of course, a wealth of information, all of which indicates that torture is an incredibly ineffective interrogation technique. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 261–62 (2004);
DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY (forthcoming 2007) (“Advocates of torture often
assume that torture works in this sense better than other methods of investigation and all
that is left is the moral justification. But if torture does not work, if it cannot be administered professionally, scientifically, and productively, if it offers no temporal advantage in
the case of “a ticking time bomb,” then the whole argument is pointless. Can torture be
used to intimidate prisoners? Yes. Can it force false confessions [sic] yes? Can it produce
true information better than other policing techniques? No. . . . The available empirical
evidence on this is conclusive.”).
59 The only exception to this role, it seems, is Bauer himself:
Virtually the sole exception to this rule is Jack Bauer. The current season begins with Bauer being released from a Chinese prison, after two years of ceaseless torture; his back is scarred and his hands are burnt, but a Communist official who transfers Bauer to U.S. custody says that he “never broke his silence.”
Mayer, supra note 7, at 69. See also 24: Day 2: 2:00 AM–3:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Apr. 15, 2003) (showing Jack bound and gagged, his abdomen is cut several times
with a scalpel dipped in ammonia, and the open wounds are burnt; he is then tasered
twice and then CPR and epinephrine must be administered to revive him; Jack reveals
nothing); 24: Day 2: 3:00 AM–4:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Apr. 22, 2003) (showing
Jack’s chest being shocked with a defibrillator, after which he is given a dose of medication to paralyze his diaphragm, preventing him from breathing; Jack still reveals nothing). But see 24: Day 2: 7:00 PM–8:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 11, 2003) (showing that after Jack’s interrogation of a suspected terrorist fails, Jack stages the killing of
the terrorist’s son and makes the terrorist watch the “murder” on tape, and the terrorist
still refuses to talk); 24: Day 5: 6:00 PM–7:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Mar. 6, 2006)
(showing Jack giving a man large doses of a pain-inducing drug to convince him to reveal
information, but the man refuses to succumb).
60 24: Day 6: 12:00 PM–1:00 PM, supra note 57.
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Second, torture is used only on the guilty and only when it is
imminently necessary to obtain information. In much the same
way that Inbau and Reid counseled that coercive interrogation
techniques should only be used when there is a high probability
of the suspect’s guilt,62 so Jack and his colleagues resort to torture only when it is clear that nothing else will get the job done.63
Third, Jack Bauer does not seem to enjoy employing torture.64 While others on the show—Islamic terrorists, the Chinese—either use torture gratuitously or seem to derive a sadistic
thrill from its use, Jack resorts to it only when it is necessary and
only when he is convinced that it will produce the results he
needs. If the “ticking time-bomb” scenario is the best argument
for torture—Alan Dershowitz argues that a warrant for torture
should be issued if necessary to prevent imminent harm65—then
24 makes that argument each week. Given how successful torture is at obtaining the truth, and given how high the stakes are
on 24, it is hard to see how anyone could be against torture.66
61 See, e.g., Todd R. Samelman, Note, Junk Science in Federal Courts: Judicial Understanding of Scientific Principles: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), 6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 263, 264 (2001) (“Over the seventy-year use of the
Frye standard, only the admissibility of lie detector tests received negative treatment . . . .”).
62 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 451 (1966) (“In a serious case, the interrogation
may continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but with no respite
from the atmosphere of domination. It is possible in this way to induce the subject to talk
without resorting to duress or coercion. The method should be used only when the guilt of
the subject appears highly probable.” (quoting CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 112 (1956))).
63 See, for example, 24: Day 6: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM, supra note 52, where Jack suffocates his brother with a plastic bag to gain information; 24: Day 6: 12:00 AM–1:00 PM
(FOX television broadcast Feb. 5, 2007), where Jack, in desperation, has his brother injected with a painful serum to force him to speak; 24: Day 6: 5:00 PM–6:00 PM, supra note
58, where Jack uses a cigar cutter to cut off the tip of a suspect’s pinky and threatens to
shoot him in order to prevent nuclear warheads from launching; 24: Day 2: 9:00 PM–10:00
PM, supra note 58, where Jack shoots the only available terrorist with knowledge of a
bomb’s location and refuses to give her pain killers until she gives information; see also
24: Day 5: 6:00 PM–7:00 PM, supra note 59; 24: Day 4: 5:00 PM–6:00 PM (FOX television
broadcast Feb. 28, 2005). But see id., where Jack tortures Paul Raines with an electric
wire in the mistaken belief that he is associated with terrorists; Paul quickly forgives
Jack, eventually taking a bullet that was meant for him.
64 See, e.g., 24: Day 6, 7:00 AM–8:00 AM, supra note 56; 24: Day 6, 12:00 PM–1:00
PM, supra note 57. As one expert has put it, Jack seems surprisingly unchanged by the
things he has done over the years. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 6, at 72 (“Joe Navarro, one
of the F.B.I.’s top experts in questioning techniques . . . told me, ‘Only a psychopath can
torture and be unaffected. You don’t want people like that in your organization. They are
untrustworthy, and tend to have grotesque other problems.’”).
65 Dershowitz, supra note 43.
66 In fact, the popularity of the show has been taken by some on the right as an endorsement of the use of torture in the War on Terror. For example, on the Fox News
Channel, conservative commentator Laura Ingraham described the popularity of the show
24 as being “as close to a national referendum” on the use of “tough tactics” in the War on
Terror as we are likely to see. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News Channel broadcast Sept. 13,
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IV. THE 24 EFFECT
As I stated above, my concern is not necessarily that torture
will return to the interrogation rooms of the United States.67
While police professionalization and judicial oversight may not
have entirely eliminated the abuse of suspects in our country,
these processes have largely removed the third degree from the
repertoire of techniques available to officers interested in obtaining a conviction. Furthermore, given the lack of scrutiny that
courts generally give to Mirandized confessions,68 police officers
working today rarely need to resort to physical abuse in order to
obtain confessions.
What concerns me about the current torture debate in the
United States is the desensitizing effect that depictions of torture
can have. Compared with torture, coercive but non-violent interrogation techniques—the litany of techniques expressly disapproved of by the Miranda court—pale by comparison. Isolating a
suspect from his support network, diminishing the seriousness of
his crime, feigning sympathy for his plight, using promises of leniency or threats of increased punishment to obtain a confession—these techniques simply do not resonate with the American
public the way physical brutality does.69 As a result, I fear that
the public as well as the courts may become even more accepting
of these practices than they already are.
Why would this increased acceptance of coercive but non2006).

67 Not everyone is so sanguine about the lines between torture in the military and
torture at home. For example, in an article in Slate magazine, Darius Rejali argues that
the connection has been made before:
[T]his corruption will not be limited to the military. Two-track interrogation
systems have similar corrupting influences in domestic policing, particularly as
former interrogators and MPs seek jobs as police officers after being decommissioned. The military tortures in the Franco-Algerian War soon seeped into
French policing in the 1960s. And in the United States, this kind of slippage
has happened twice: initially, as the water tortures of the Spanish-American
War began appearing in police stations in the 1920s, and again as electrical
techniques used during the Vietnam War appeared in Chicago policing in the
1970s. These torturers-turned-policemen-turned-torturers were especially attracted to techniques that were clean, and there is every reason to believe that
the clean techniques now approved in the Iraq war will, sooner or later, appear
in a neighborhood near you.
Darius Rejali, Containing Torture: How Torture Begets Even More Torture, SLATE, Oct.
27, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2152268/.
68 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“[c]ases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare.” (alteration in original) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
433 n.20 (1984))).
69 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 910 (2004).
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torturous interrogation be so problematic? It is important to remember that the techniques currently in use by police departments were extensively catalogued and explicitly critiqued by the
Miranda court. On its way to mandating the now-familiar warnings, the Court described these psychologically coercive techniques as being “equally destructive of human dignity” as the
third degree.70 Even if we do not find this appeal to human dignity compelling,71 there is great reason to be concerned about coercion in the interrogation room.
Principally, for my purposes, it is important to remember
that the coercive interrogation techniques catalogued but ultimately upheld in Miranda are likely to produce false confessions.
The social science literature on interrogation makes two things
very clear: One, false confessions are a leading cause of wrongful
convictions, and two, they are most often attributable to coercive
interrogation techniques. As Leo, Drizin, Neufeld, Hall, and
Vatner recently wrote:
The primary cause of false confession is the interrogator’s
use of psychologically coercive interrogation techniques
such as implicit or explicit promises of leniency in exchange for confession and threats of differential punishment in the absence of confession. Other coercive techniques include lengthy or incommunicado interrogation;
depriving essential necessities such as food, sleep, water,
or access to bathroom facilities; refusing to honor a suspect’s request to terminate interrogation; and inducing
extreme exhaustion and fatigue. Some researchers have
argued that additional situational risk factors that may
cause innocent people to confess falsely include physical
custody and isolation, confrontation, and minimization
techniques.72
If this parade of horribles sounds familiar, it should. The interrogation techniques that Leo and his co-authors identify with
false confessions match up with surprising consistency to the
70 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (“It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the
will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure,
this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity.”).
71 See, e.g., id. at 539 (White, J., dissenting).
The most basic function of any government is to provide for the security of
the individual and of his property. These ends of society are served by the
criminal laws which for the most part are aimed at prevention of crime. Without the reasonably effective performance of the task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized values.
Id. (citations omitted).
72 Richard A. Leo, et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 517.
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techniques described by the Miranda Court as common interrogation techniques in the post-Brown world.73
The danger of a false confession that is induced by coercive
techniques is compounded by the apparently innocuous nature of
these techniques. The risk of false confessions leading to wrongful conviction would be greatly minimized if it were broadly understood that coercive interrogation techniques can induce even
an innocent person to confess. Sadly, however, quite the opposite
appears to be the case. As Drizin and Leo write:
[I]n the era of psychological interrogation, the phenomenon of false
confession has become counter-intuitive. Because police interrogation
is beyond the common knowledge of individuals who have neither experienced it firsthand as a criminal suspect nor performed it as a
trained police officer—i.e., the vast majority of the American public—
most people are ignorant of the psychologically manipulative methods
and strategies of police interrogators. Most people do not appear to
know that interrogation-induced false confessions even exist, let alone
that police detectives are sent to specialized training schools to learn
the techniques of interrogation or how and why they are designed to
manipulate the perceptions, reasoning, and decision-making of a custodial suspect and thus lead to the decision to confess. Like many
criminal justice officials, most people appear to believe in what one of
the authors has labeled “the myth of psychological interrogation”: that
an innocent person will not falsely confess to a serious crime unless he
is physically tortured or mentally ill.74

In other words, the impact of psychological interrogation is compounded by its stealth character. Because the defendant does not
appear in the courtroom with bruises and welts, it is easier for
the judge to find that his confession was voluntarily given.
As we become more accustomed to bruised and beaten bodies
in Iraq, on television dramas, and in the movies, the gap between
what we know is possible and what happens in the run-of-themill criminal case will inevitably become wider. My fear is that
as we become more aware of the possibility and reality of horrific
violence being perpetrated against detainees, anything less than
that will come to seem tame by comparison. This will lead courts
to monitor Mirandized interrogations even less than they do now,
will likely produce more coerced confessions, and will ultimately
result in more false confessions and wrongful convictions. This
should be troubling regardless of one’s views about the wisdom or
legitimacy of Miranda.

73
74

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446–47.
Drizin & Leo, supra note 69, at 910.
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CONCLUSION
The fortieth anniversary of the Miranda decision provides us
with an opportunity to re-examine our recent past and to consider the future of interrogation in this country. From Bram to
Brown to Miranda, courts have consistently, though not uniformly,75 increased their supervision of what happens in the stationhouse. In response, law enforcement officials have adapted
to these changing rules and have found ways to continue to question suspects and obtain information within the dictates of the
law.
My concern is that torture will change this balance. Because
torture lowers our baseline assumptions about the fair treatment
of detainees, I worry that it will negatively impact the judicial
oversight of interrogation in a way that will be very difficult to
undo.

75 The direction of the law is rarely uniform in any field. There have been decisions,
both before Miranda and after, that have had the effect of contracting rather than expanding the rights of those undergoing interrogation. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda, but not of the
Fifth Amendment itself, could be used for impeachment purposes); Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that a suspect subject to questioning during a traffic stop is
not in custody for Miranda purposes); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (approving a
Miranda waiver in a case where counsel had been retained by family members and had
been expressly told by police officers that the suspect would not be interrogated that
night); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that Miranda warnings need not
be given when the officer who questions the suspect is undercover). This list is by no
means exhaustive.

